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Two major conclusions follow from this very careful study. First, sophisticated prediction tools 
do not fare well relative to naive models predicting return based on past sample means. Second, 
there appear to be short-lived episodes of quite limited return predictability. These conclusions 
are consistent with all we know from the theoretical developments in financial economics over 
the past thirty five years and more. Yet how do we reconcile these facts with the widespread 
perception that market returns are in fact predictable, and that hedge funds in particular are adept 
at exploiting this predictability? 
 
The increasingly sophisticated apparatus presented in the financial asset pricing literature has as 
its objective deriving models that might most accurately describe the cross section of expected 
security returns. The sample mean return can be considered a reasonable estimator of expected 
return, and so it is not surprising that it is a very robust straw man when comparing alternative 
predictive models. The apparent disconnect between the financial markets and real economic 
activity has encouraged a behavioral view of the markets and the hope and promise of limited 
predictability. However, recent work by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) explains that at least part 
of this tension arises from the strong assertion of stationarity. Allowing for conditional 
expectations which can change through time as economic conditions fluctuate explains much of 
this disconnect. This suggests that only sample means based on the most recent historical data 
are relevant for predicting future returns, consistent with the results in this paper. Further, it 
suggests some benefit might be drawn from conditioning the predictions on current state 
variables characterizing the state of the economy.  However, while this is of some scientific 
interest, it provides limited guidance for practitioners, as presumably the alternative investments 
necessary to capitalize on this perception of predictability depend on the same state variables.  
 
More recently work by Lo (2004) argues that there is no innate mechanism that guarantees that 
the market will adjust instantaneously to new and changing economic circumstances. Arguing 
for a more evolutionary approach to the market, he proposes an Adaptive Expectations 
Hypothesis according to which change leads to profit opportunities which erode through time as 
market participants learn to take advantage of them. One prediction of this model is that these 
profit opportunities will give rise to predictability in the markets that will be localized and 
limited in scope and duration. This elusive return predictability appears to be confirmed in the 
empirical results of this paper.  
 
How can we reconcile this evidence with the widespread perception among professional 
investors that market returns are in fact predictable and that there are considerable fortunes to be 
made predicting the market? Much of the perception of predictability comes from the undue faith 
many practitioners have in backtesting. Overfitting the past history of returns is one of the 
occupational hazards of the business, and brings to mind the aphorism of G. K. Chesterton that 
“ten false philosophies will fit the universe”1 Ex post conditioning can also give rise to the 
                                                 
1“The Honour of Israel Gow” in The Innocence of Father Brown (1911) 
perception of predictability as the practitioner is necessarily a prisoner of history2. In each case 
as this paper shows, the comparison of models out-of-sample provides a healthy antidote to the 
false perception of predictability.        
 
This paper shows that simple models based on the past history of equity returns and (principal 
components of) macroeconomic innovations find it difficult predict returns, at least according to 
standard and well established statistical criteria. Indeed, the paper considers at different points at 
least four different criteria of predictability, including the Bayes Information criterion, RMSE 
out of sample, backward looking out of sample R2, and the sign criterion proposed by Peseran 
and Timmermann (1992). However, predictability is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish 
the profitability of a trading strategy based on the same information. Advances in neural net 
technology cannot exclude the possibility that there is some arcane pattern recognition algorithm 
used by a successful seat-of-the-pants trader that might dominate an overparameterized neural 
net procedure in an out-of-sample exercise. Predictability if detected may not be profitable if the 
                                                 
2Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) discuss the role of ex post conditioning in giving 
rise to a false perception of predictability. The success of many well-known hedge fund 
managers (see for example “Make Less Than $240 Million? You're Off Top Hedge Fund 
List”New York Times April 24, 2007) can be attributed to many factors, including the willingness 
to take great risk on behalf of their wealthy clients providing liquidity to the markets. In another 
example of ex post conditioning, the great wealth of successful hedge fund managers is widely 
reported. Not so widely reported are those who take great risk and lose. 
range of variation in the predictable component of returns matches the predictable rise and fall of 
the cost of funds used to exploit this predictability. 
 
It is understandable why statisticians prefer predictability to profitability. It is dangerous to draw 
statistical inferences from the pattern of trading returns where the distribution of those returns 
depends heavily on the strategy used to exploit apparent predictability. The interpretation that an 
extreme tail event brought down Long Term Capital Management was based on a parametric 
representation of the process generating trading profits (Lowenstein 2000). Indeed Goetzmann et 
al. (2004) show that traders have a positive incentive to vary the statistical distribution of trading 
payoffs to influence the performance metrics by which they are judged. 
 
In a quite remarkable early paper Cowles (1934) addressed both the issue of how to characterize 
the pattern recognition algorithm of seat-of-the-pants traders as well as the technology which 
might be used to examine the statistical significance of resulting trading profits3. William Peter 
Hamilton, the editor of the Wall Street Journal from 1902 to 1929 had a reputation for successful 
forecasting established over a long period of years. Experts analyzed his editorials on the state of 
the markets and concluded that he had essentially recommended buying into the market 140 
times, selling the market 41 times and holding the market 74 times. While this strategy earned 12 
percent per annum, this strategy lost 3.5 percent per annum relative to simply buying and holding 
stocks comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average over the period. The same analysis applied 
                                                 
3These results are discussed in Brown Goetzmann and Kumar (1998) 
to the recommendations of 24 financial publications yielded similar results. But were these losses 
statistically significant? Cowles proposed a novel bootstrap in strategy space to examine this 
question.  In one instance, a forecaster had 240 weeks of experience. 239 cards were made up 
which recorded the trades implied by their forecasts, and were drawn at random to create a 
hypothetical trading record with the same frequency of buy and sell operations. The best 
forecasters had a realized performance insignificantly different from the hypothetical bootstrap 
strategy, while the worst performance was significantly worse than the random trading strategy. 
Cowles therefore concludes with this paper that predictability is indeed elusive4. 
 
 
                                                 
4The use of the Peseran and Timmermann (1992) sign test comes closest to an analysis of 
trading rule profitability. While we did not attempt to replicate precisely the experiments 
reported in this paper, we found similar results over the same period of time using a VAR based 
on past returns augmented by Fama and French (1992) factors where the model was estimated 
for each month based on prior month data and lags chosen each month according to a Bayes 
Information Criterion. For the period January 1970 to December 2005 the resulting Peseran and 
Timmermann (1992) p-value was 4.83% suggestive of predictability, and the performance was 
superior to that of the S&P500 over the same period with a Sharpe ratio (Sharpe (1966)) of .063 
relative to the S&P500 over the same period of 0.048. The Cowles bootstrap procedure with one 
million replications using the same frequency of buy and sell decisions, yielded a p-value of 
6.32% for this performance, very similar to the Peseran and Timmermann number. 
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